

A
LETTER
FROM A
GENTLEMAN
IN THE
CITY,
TO A
LORD
IN THE
COUNTRY,

Concerning the present Conjunction
of Affairs.

Printed in the Year, 1691.

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My LORD,

I Suppose it cannot be long before your Lordship will be coming to the Parliament: You have generally attended all those Meetings, so I imagine you will think the present Conjunction as well worth your pains in coming to Town as ever any was yet. And if your Writ by which your Lordship is called, be to consult *de arduis regni negotiis*, one may modestly affirm, there never were more difficult Affairs to require every mans serious consideration. The War we are engag'd in against the most powerful Monarch on Earth, the Taxes that have been impos'd on the People to support the War, the want of Conduct as well as of Success in many parts of it, and the seeming difficulties to find means to continue the charge of it; are circumstances that might well near distract a people, who were even perfectly settled at home, and had nothing to controvert amongst themselves of the Legality of their own Constitution, and were all of one mind in every thing relating to the Government both in Church and State. But when our unhappy circumstances find us in so differing a condition from this, I should hope that every man, who has any thing to loose or keep in *England*, that values either Friends or Relations, Estate or Religion: should think it high time to consider seriously of these things: and I am confident your Lordship, who is always dispos'd to lay things to heart that are fairly represented to you, will receive favourably these poor thoughts of mine, intended very honestly for your service, and which may

serve at least to ripen your own judgment for more proper considerations. For my own part, of all these ill circumstances I have been mentioning, none seem to me to be of any very dangerous consequence, but what relates to the present unsettled condition of the Crown; which since the late revolution must be own'd to have been but in a tottering condition; and for ought I see, is still like to want the united strength of such hearts and hands, as are only able and willing to support it, against the inveterate and sworn enemies of it in the land. Without this one fatal addition to our distractions, I confess I should not think that either the Power of *France*, or the Malice of Popery; or the present low condition of our Trade (tho' every one of these I allow to be dismal prospects) were so much to be apprehended, but that with honest and diligent endeavours, with care and time, we might out-grow those distempers. And therefore my present design is to Treat of this one point relating to the Crown; to see if it be possible to reconcile all the servants and friends of Monarchical Government, to the present possessors of the Throne; much doubting that if their present Majesties be left to be serv'd only by those who were most active and instrumental in inviting them over; or by such as have only ends of their own to serve, but have not principles to stick by a Kingly Government, they will be at best but weekly supported, and very probably most wretchedly abandoned.

The beginning of such discourses is usually introduc'd by this Question, Whither Government be founded upon the Command and Institution of God, or upon the consent and agreement of the People. And though I am of opinion we may come to our point without determining that matter, I will touch a little upon it, because it may lead us on by degrees into our present business. There are very many learned men, who do not doubt to

pronounce positively, and they claim no less authority for their opinion than the Word of God, that the several Species of Government, and the Persons who should Govern, were all ordain'd by God, and never left to the election of the People: and that it is not only inconsistent with reason, but even impossible, that any Government can derive its power from the people; or that it can so much as be known, what the mind of the People would be in such an occasion. There are others very great and knowing men too, that will not allow such a Government as this, I mean, of God's own Institution, ever to have been but in Speculation, since the time of God's governing the *Jews* in his own person: that it has been totally impracticable for several Ages, that the foundation of all Government is an original contract with the People, which whoever breaks, is in danger of loosing the benefit of his bargain. For my part, I will not enter into a close dispute upon this argument, but I may venture I think, to say, that what is urged so far on either side, is carry'd a little too warmly by both, and by criticizing upon words, rather than by entring solidly upon the matter.

Popular Elections are things I am not fond of, and yet I cannot forbear mentioning one passage in Scripture, which I confess, leaves some room, in my poor opinion, to doubt whether there be not a precedent in it for the consent of the People, in accepting their King or chief Governour. I have never met with it in any argument of this kind, and therefore am rather inclin'd to think there may be no great weight in it. The passage is in the first Chapter of *Joshua*, where from the 1st. verse to the 12th. God is speaking to *Joshua*, after the death of *Moses*; giving him the Government of his people the *Jews*, commanding him to observe the Laws of *Moses* constantly and religiously; exhorting him to be strong and
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of good courage, and promising, *that he will be with him as he was with Moses.* After this, from the 12th. verse to the 16th. *Joshua* is speaking to the people, to the Reubenites, the Gadites, and half the tribe of *Manasseh*, giving them directions what they were to do, to which in the 16, 17, and 18. verses, they answer, All that thou commandest us we will do, and whithersoever thou sendest us we will go, according as we hearkned unto *Moses* so will we hearken unto thee, *Only the Lord thy God be with thee as he was with Moses.* Whosoever he be that rebels against thy Commandment, and will not hearken unto thy words, in all that thou commandest him, he shall be put to death, *Only be strong and of a good courage.* I will not presume to raise any argument from this part of Scripture, I understand not the Original Language the holy Bible was writ in, and therefore cannot tell the force of these *Only's* twice repeated by the people, they seem to me indeed to be of the nature of a strong condition on the behalf of the people. But I would ask this question, If the consent of the People to obey *Joshua* were not necessary, why have we an account that they gave it? and then make your reflection, that the Scripture in another place, in the same book of *Joshua*, having said this people were 40000. men, who cannot be suppos'd to have spoken all, nor yet is it said who were their representatives, nor how they were chosen, yet their mind was delivered plainly enough to *Joshua*, What then will become of one of the main difficulties, the *jure divino* men bring against a Government by Popular Election, viz. That the People know not how to chuse their Representatives, and that their sense on such an occasion is not to be discover'd. And from this passage I have quoted, I hope it cannot be deny'd, but that the people have a right to put their Prince in mind to be Religious and devout towards God, that *the Lord his God may be with him*, and
that

that he be *strong and of a good courage*, that his People may be assured they shall be protected by him, and live quietly under his Government, secure from foreign Invasions, or intestine troubles, and this right in the People to call only upon their King, to do his duty towards God, and in his Government, for which we do not find they had any rebuke, may lay a great foundation for their having some sort of pretence to make a contract with him.

But not to stir this matter any more, let it be allow'd that all Government is of God's institution: it is not my business to quench this spirit, it is advantageous for all Governments that the people should think so, and I need not say how pernicious it may prove to all Princes, that they should depend upon it intirely. But be it so, *The powers that be are ordained of God*. What is to be concluded from hence in relation to our Government, is the next thing to be inquir'd into. And this leads me into an argument very weighty indeed, and nice enough to be treated. I will do it as gently as I can, but it must be touch'd or we cannot go on, and that is, the Nature and constitution of our own Government, which whither it be originally *jure divino* absolute in the Prince, or mixt with a compact and agreement of the People, cannot I think be deny'd to have been by a long succession of time, by all our Laws and constant practice, now so settled, without being controverted by the Kings themselves, That the power of the Prince, I think I may say his prerogative too, may be lessened and restrain'd as often as the two Houses of Parliament agree upon any thing that for the publick good they think fit to present to him for that purpose. It may be the language of some men bred up in Court, and ambitious of raising their fortune there, That the King of *England* is an absolute sovereign Prince, hath his title only from God, the People have their property indeed, but His prerogative so sacred, that it ought never to be infringed.

fringed. That this Prince makes Peace and War of his own authority, that he makes and dissolves foreign treaties, that he disposes of all offices, Military, Civil and Ecclesiastical. These are indeed ensigns of sovereignty, and from hence I suppose it may be argued, this sovereignty is of God's institution, the People are not admitted to a share in it, Therefore touch not the anointed of the Lord. But when this lofty *jure divino* stile comes to be calmly taken in pieces by a plain Country-man, that sits quietly under his own Vine, and desires to preserve it flourishing and thriving under the good influence of our Laws, which tell him that by the undisputable constitution of our Government, the Prince can raise no Money without the consent of his People in Parliament, what can one in good reason conclude but that this power of making Peace and War, and of entering into foreign treaties and alliances are indeed but empty names. *Nihil tam instabile ac fluxum quam fama potentia non sua vi nixa.* One must conclude that even the disposition of offices, if it be wisely done, I mean of such as are of importance in the administration of the Government, must be with a regard to the good opinion of the Parliament, or if there be no Parliament sitting, to the good opinion of his good Subjects who may be of the Parliament. And from hence one might almost be tempted to think that this Prince in our Government is so far from being seated in the power of acting by himself alone in the greatest and highest points, that he cannot so much as make a Minister of State, or which is yet harder possibly, is not able to preserve him without the good opinion and liking of his Parliament. And now perhaps it may be granted me, Though the powers that be are ordained of God, Our supreme power in *England* is not by the constitution of our Government ordain'd in the King alone, nor hath it in point of fact ever been so practiced or submitted to in our Land. What will it advantage the

maintainers

maintainers of the *jure divino* doctrine to alledge, that in the beginning of our Government it was otherwise, if they cannot deny but that now, by pacts and agreements with their people, of which the Kings are now no more the masters, the authority and the influence and sway of the Government is thus divided between them and their People.

The greatest of our Kings who have been the readiest to expose their Persons the most generously in the honour and defence of their Country, have always found the ~~firm~~ ^{firm} and force of the Nation represented in a Parliament was to be yielded to; and such of them who being wise or great only in their own conceits, have weakly and unadvisedly endeavour'd to check the torrent, have been unfortunately born down and destroy'd by it. Our Chronicles from the beginning of what they deliver to us, down to these last times, are full of examples of this nature, and through the whole course of our Histories, our Kings have not been so happy or so much esteem'd for the title of their birth-right, as they who having not had that fortification about them, have recompenc'd that want by a more strict and impartial administration of Justice, and more closely pursuing the true and solid interest of their Kingdoms. How this compliance of the Crown with the People was first brought to pass, need not be the business of this Letter to enquire into: It is sufficient that we not only find it so at this day, but that for a very long time it has been so to a very great degree by our Constitution. But it is become much more necessary of late years, since some of our Kings having unwarily wasted their ancient Revenues in Land, and parted with such flowers and regalities that created a dependance upon them equal to that of wealth and riches, still aiming at a greater state and magnificence than their Predecessors, have brought the Crown now at length almost entirely to depend on the

assistance of the People for its support even in time of peace, and then every man must allow that they will have a greater share in the management of all publick affairs. It's an old saying, and old sayings are commonly true, The borrower is a servant to the lender. They who carry the Purse, and can open and shut it absolutely at their own choice, will have a respect paid them throughout the whole administration, let some men imagine what incomprehensible station they please for the prerogative of the King to rule in by it self alone.

They may say it is the King's prerogative to make War, where and when he judges fit, but it is in the good judgment of the People to support, or leave him in it.

They may say it is the King's prerogative to appoint the Judges, and all the Officers of State, according to his pleasure, but it is the privilege of the People to call any Officers of State to account, and pursue them to punishment if they be faulty.

The King has a right to ask for aids of his People, and it is the privilege and most commonly the practice too of the People, to ask for redress of grievances, and obtain it too, before they part with their money.

It is the King's prerogative indeed to call, prorogue or dissolve Parliaments, but while he thus stands in need of their assistance, not only for extraordinary aids and supplies, but for the maintenance of his Court and Household expences, it is not likely he will prorogue them long, or dissolve them often, because every time he does it, without gratifying his people in their just desires, he brings greater inconveniences and difficulties upon himself.

Thus you see how our Government is divided between the King and the People in all the parts of it, and who soever he be that delights in flattering a King of England, that his Prerogative is so great, that he is not to be called

to account for his actions, I will not dispute with that man about Names and Words, but I think its plain by what has been said, that a King of *England* at long discord with his People, may be any thing but a great King. He must be the most miserable man alive, and if he be not actually dethroned he leads a more wretched life, having nothing of power left him but the name. For I think one may affirm it to have been a constant rule without an exception, that whenever the Prerogatives of our Kings have come to shock with the Priviledges and Liberties of the People, that Prince who hath not been wise enough to find some expedient to put a speedy end to such debates, has fallen an unfortunate Sacrifice in the Controversie.

But because I apprehend some men may say, it's not sufficient to alledge what hath been in fact the fate of such Princes, as have been so unfortunately engag'd, except it could appear that by right they ought so to have suffer'd : I must endeavour to say a word to that point ; wherein, besides long usage and custom which becomes a Law, and constant precedents all on one side, are the best measures to guide our judgments by : The highest assertors of the *jure divino* doctrine will allow, the people in a Parliamentary way may endeavour to get their grievances redress'd, and abuses in Government reform'd ; they may in a Parliament contend with their Prince, shew him where he has been in the wrong, and who has misguided him. They cannot deny, but that the representing body of the Nation may wrestle with their Prince, and sometimes give him a fair fall too, in a legislative way : and they have a fine notion to salve this resistance in the subject, and find it is not against the divine institution neither, in this method ; because say they, the Laws are not of the Peoples making but the Kings. No doubt that Kings would willingly and of their own accord make Laws to reprove the weakness of their own Government,

and to punish the ill Ministers whom their own favour has advanced. This is a pretty Notion indeed with which men of speculation may please themselves in a Cloister, and men of conversation and practical Knowledge will make themselves as merry in the World. All things may be attempted, say these notional men; in a legislative way, to restrain the power of the Prince, or to reduce the exercise of his arbitrary Authority; but if these means will not do, if the Prince cannot be prevail'd upon by such methods, and betakes himself to force to assert his own power, then the people have nothing to do but to submit. This seems to be a hard saying to a Nation govern'd by Laws, whose Prince by the law in times of peace ought to have no more force on his side than the people have on theirs. But here 'tis high time to put an end to this argument, since what farther might be said upon it might possibly better be let alone. And so I submit this part of the question to every man of honour, honesty and common sense in the Nation.

I am not unsensible, my Lord, that the warmth of this subject may seem to have carried me from the principles which I have always hitherto owned to support a kingly government in this Nation. It often happens so indeed to men engaged in debates, striving to destroy one extreme to fall into that which is opposite to it; but I own my self still of the same Monarchical principles: and tho' I am not without my satisfaction, and benefit too, in the privileges of the people; I am not of opinion one can have an entire security in this great body, without it have a wise and proper head. And I hope to shew you that the station of a King here is not so difficult, but a great Prince may have a very happy and glorious part in it. For after all that has been said, a King of *England* who knows the Laws of his Country, and will govern by them, who is not led aside by flatterers, and prefers not the opinion of his

his favourites before the affection of his People; a King who is cautious how he engages in War with his neighbours for fear of burdening his Subjects unnecessarily with Taxes, and takes the utmost care, that what is unavoidably laid upon them on such accounts, be apply'd usefully and advantageously to the publick good, for the protection of his People, and the mainrenance and increase of their Trade: And if through ill or unfortunate conduct there happen to be miscarriages that grieve and afflict his People, is willing to let them when represented in Parliament, look into and examine the causes of them, and punish the Authors if there be occasion. A King, I say, by whom his People see and feel themselves thus trusted, beloved, esteemed and cherished, is the greatest and happiest Prince in the World: Such a Prince may truly be said to be of divine Institution, for he can never be shaken in his Throne. And as it was said in the holy Scripture of the flowers of the field, which toil not neither spin, and yet even Solomon in all his glory was not array'd like one of them: So one need not be afraid to affirm, that not the *French* King himself, the envy of all Christian powers, with all his greatness and riches, with all the borrowed rays of that glorious Sun which with so much vanity he affects; nor with all his good Ministers neither, united as they are most eminently in their principles, diligence and zeal for their Masters Service, can be so terrible to his enemies, or such a support to his friends and allies; as a King of *England*, thus fixt in the true and solid interest of his People.

A King of *England*, who following his own irregular appetites, through mistaken zeal or ambition to advance his own greatness and fame, either for this world or the next; happens to put himself into an interest opposite to the good of his people, wherein they cannot in honour and prudence, and dare not in Conscience join to support

port him, must expect to meet with many storms, and at best to conduct his Ministry through much tribulation amidst the continual complaints and grievances of his Subjects. And on the contrary, One who comes to reign with no other thought, but to promote the happiness of his people, and is as eminent above his Subjects in Justice and Piety, as in Rank and Dignity, and has no design but to be a friend to their friends, and an enemy to their enemies throughout his whole reign, may be more absolute than all the Eastern Monarchs in the World. Whose Property, or whose Life may not he command, and what Laws may not he dispence with at his will and pleasure, when the People have a confidence and an experience in him, that all he does is for their good and advantage? In short, The latter of these is the most absolute and powerful of all men, esteemed, adored, beloved, or fear'd at home and abroad. And the other, The most unfortunate man a-live, unregarded in his prosperity, and unpitied in his fall. So that after this demonstrable vast difference of fortune, I should think it would be no ill service to recommend this advice perpetually to all Kings of England, whether they be born or brought by other accidents to the Throne; That they come prepared to govern this Nation on this condition; *That they keep their Statutes and observe their Laws,*

Maria ac terras populosq; regenti—Quis Comes utilior?

I am afraid I may have tired your Lordships patience with having been too long upon this point. I confess I thought it necessary to dwell a little the more upon it, that I might make it the more plain, that whencesoever our Government is deriv'd to us, whether by Divine Institution, or by compact with the People, it is now grown up into a part of our Constitution, that the People must have a very great share in it; and such a one that, as it will be
very

very hard to tell where their part is to stop, so to be able to stop it, if one did know when *hic labor hoc opus est*. Upon the whole matter I profess seriously, I cannot in conscience perswade my self to believe, that it is the will of God in this our constitution, where by the Laws of the Land, and the custom and practice of so many Ages, the People have so great a share in the Government; That be the Prince never so wicked or foolish, the People must endure all the strokes of his wrath or madness, except he can be perswaded out of his own pure goodness to be more merciful and wise.

Having proceeded thus far upon the point concerning our government in *England* in general, I would now come to offer my thoughts to your Lordship in relation to what may possibly fall under your consideration, in the case of the late unfortunate King *James* in particular. Who tho' he be the unhappy occasion of much trouble in this Land, ought not to be mention'd without compassion and tenderness. Far be it from me to add weight to his misfortunes; God knows they are heavy enough of themselves. The invasion he had made upon the Laws, by assuming that extraordinary and unprecedented power of dispensing with them all; needs not be aggravated; and the violent steps to introduce and establish the Popish religion, cannot be forgotten. I will mention therefore but these two heads, which were sufficient indeed, and did actually awaken three Kingdoms to see the danger they were in, and to think of providing for their security: and there is certainly no assertion of the *jure divino* doctrine in *England*, but will even in a civil highly necessary to provide for it. Tell me, that the way, all ye rigid supporters of non-resistance, what was then to be done, and done wisely and effectually in that conjuncture; that we might not pass for fools or knaves in our own time, and to all posterity. I suppose all men will be ready to cry out, Our Parliament, great Par-

liament,

liament, the only skilful and try'd Physician for all English distempers. I will pass over the difficulties there were to prevail with that Prince to call a Parliament, because it would be too tedious to run through them all, and they are yet fresh in every man's memory, and because I will rather late the case briefly, as it was once, when the Writs were out for a Parliament to meet, and there seem'd to be an intention in that King to have advised with that great Physician. So now I have brought your Lordship to the consideration of our condition in *Sept.* and *Octob.* 1688. Let us then suppose, if you please, what that Parliament had met. I must desire the *juris divini* men to come along with me, because hitherto I am sure they were with me in their judgments, several of the Bishops having joyn'd with some temporal Lords in a Petition to that King for a Parliament. It would be hard to say what would have been the first work to have begun with. There might perhaps have been some debates what would have been the most necessary, but I suppose in conclusion, *Genl.* The miscarriages of that reign must have been laid open, and the wretched flattering Ministers, that had either led or followed their unhappy Master in those desperate courses, must have been made examples of publick justice. I must own the first part of this, would not have been a very delightful sight; nor the second a very glorious action for that King to have had a share in. *Genl.* The Papists in *England*, the dearly, if not the only beloved of their Prince, must have been generally banish'd, or under worse circumstances here at home. *Genl.* The appointing of Judges, and all Officers of State I will not determine where it should have been lodg'd, no more than the nominating of Bishops, and disposing of other Ecclesiastical preferments: but I will appeal to the *juris divini* men, if they would have been content to have let that power have continued at the will and pleasure of that King. The

The Army in all probability must have been disbanded; or such part of it as should have been judg'd necessary to have been continued, together with the intire command of the Fleet, must have been in the hands of such as the two Houses of Parliament should have judg'd worthy, and capable of that trust.

I doubt the Revenue of the Crown, the largeness and plentifulness of which had first lifted up this Prince's heart, and turn'd his head, to think all things were lawful that he fancy'd expedient, would probably have been reduced, or most certainly the greatest part of it must have been appropriated to the publick uses of the Government, and no more left at his private disposition.

There was then one called a Prince of *Wales* too, who must have been taken from under the care and education of his Parents, and from the tender embraces of his Mother, who was a Princess zealous and warm enough in the way of her worship, to have contested this point unto death, upon which she must be of opinion her Son's salvation so entirely depended.

After I have taken upon me to enumerate these things, I must necessarily call upon the *jure divino* men, to speak fairly and ingenuously to me, if they do not agree that the Parliament would have asked these securities, and that they could scarce have acquiesced in less: The heads of a Paper deliver'd by some of the Bishops to King *James*, not long before his going away, contained in substance a great deal to this purpose. Thus far then I should hope the proceedings are to be justifi'd in our Government without offending the Laws of God.

If things had come to this pass, then it is not unreasonable to imagine, that King would have had some reluctance at least, to have parted with all these rights of the Crown, and the education of his only Son, and it is most probable he would have had those about him, that

should have told him these were very undutiful demands, and no ways fit for a King to grant : The consequence of this doctrine, if it had prevail'd, must have been a dissolution of that Parliament, and then I may suppose that King might have been perswaded to have had recourse to force, to chastise his undutiful subjects, that had been so bold as to endeavour to preserve their Religion and their Laws; and after that to establish his own religion and his arbitrary will and pleasure. This I conceive is not unlike the picture of those times, if King *James* had not gone away; and I will here pass over all that hinder'd this latter part of the Case, and will say nothing of the manner, or reason of his late Majesty's going away from us, and abandoning his Government, and his People, to anarchy and confusion : tho' a great deal might be said, very truly and advantageously, for those who think in conscience they may, and ought to serve and support this present Government : and therefore going on with my representation of things, as they would have been, if they had come to the pass above mention'd, and that thereupon an Army of any foreign Nation had been got by that Prince to have enslaved this. I call now upon the *jure divino* men to tell me, what were the People to have done. I profess solemnly according to their doctrine, I cannot tell. Will they say here, that because the Prince was not to be prevail'd upon in a Parliament, to give sufficient security, that the Nation should not be invaded again in all that was dear to them, and thought himself oblig'd to betake himself to open force, That therefore the People must by all means submit. Will they in this case bring Texts out of Scripture, that *whoever resists the power resists the ordinance of God, and they who resist shall receive to themselves damnation.* Or will they say that *God will take the matter into his own hands, that the hearts of Kings are in the hands of God, and that he turns them like* the

the rivers of water. Will they say a People of conscience, of wisdom, of riches, and hitherto free-born, must tamely see their Religion, their Laws, and their Liberties torn violently from them, and not make use of their utmost endeavours, as long as God gives them the use of their reasonable faculties, to secure themselves against so sad a desolation.

I hope they cannot say it, I hope they will not think it possible for flesh and blood to be sufficient for such trials, I confess such sayings are too wonderful for me, I cannot attain to them; and I do not think the law of God has tyed us up to such a servile condition. The *Israelites* themselves, tho' they were under God's immediate direction, yet they were not able to bear such usage from *Rehoboam* their King, tho' he had an undoubted *jus divinum* to his Crown, yet upon his arbitrary unadvised administration of the Government, ten Tribes revolted from him; and I do not find that they are any where censured for it. But on the contrary, when *Rehoboam* and the remnant of the *Jews* were going to reduce them by force of arms, God sent his Prophet to forbid them, *Thou shalt not go up nor fight against your brethren the children of Israel, for this thing is from me says the Lord.* Whither this be a proof that God allow'd of their separation or not, is not my business to determine; but so it seems to me, and this is certain, that after their revolt God own'd them for his peculiar people still, and anointed Kings over them, and so they continued a distinct kingdom as long as they were a people. And now I desire the *jure divino* men to shew me but one countrey under the Sun, inhabited by reasonable men, where the rigour of their doctrine has ever taken place; and if they cannot, the argument I would draw from it is, *First*, that it is not reasonable, nor morally possible, to establish such a one amongst us: That the Infallibility of the Church of Rome,

and Transubstantiation in the Sacrament, are but low easie articles of Faith, in respect of this of non-resistance to this degree; and I cannot but be of opinion if things had come to this push, what ever force or strength could have been hired from abroad to have stuck to that unfortunate Prince in that cruel attempt, the hearts and hands of all *English* men must and would have been zealously and vigorously join'd to have oppos'd him.

And since by God's wonderful Providence this fell not out to be the case, another argument that I would press is this; That if the demands which I mentioned before as reasonable for a Parliament to have made and insisted on in *Oct.* 1688. were such, as all men must allow to have been absolutely necessary, and but barely sufficient for the security of the Nation, from falling again under the power and subjection of Popish Councils. (Nay there were a great many, not unthinking nor unreasonable men, who could never have been satisfied in their judgments, that the obtaining of all these demands, or all the measures that mortal prudence could have taken, were sufficient to have secur'd these Protestant Kingdoms, from the zealous and unwearied attempts of that Popish Prince; who was of a faith to believe, he merited the Kingdom of Heaven, by his endeavours to establish that Religion; and that consequently every step he made in that work, placed him more certainly in that Kingdom, than it lost him in these.) If, I say, all those conditions were so highly necessary to have been demanded; insisted on, and obtained Then; it must then follow, according to my small capacity of understanding, That it would not be less necessary to be sure of them Now, if it were possible that there were another *Hezekiah* in this age who had interest enough with God Almighty to make the Sun return so many degrees backward as to set us all again as we were in *Sept.* 1688. And if we
were,

were, I cannot but believe that King *James* would look upon those, who offer'd him such conditions, to be as much in rebellion and treason against him, as any that should oppose him with open force in the field: Which by the way, may be a comfortable prospect for all who think it is possible to have that King here again. For my own part, I think it neither practicable nor desirable: for in a word, to speak the plain truth; That man with another growing out of his side, is not a greater monster, than such a government would be, where the King has only the name, and all the administration is without him, and above him. What Government can there be without mutual trust and confidence between a King and his people: And what trust and confidence can there be any more between that King and this people: It is not possible such a Constitution can either be long liv'd, or do any thing for its own support, while it should last, where the head and the body are in such distrust of each other: They will never perform the mutual offices necessary for the support of each other; and such a Schism must speedily end in the most arbitrary tyranny, or the rankest Commonwealth that ever was in the world.

If any thing I could say, or do, might contribute towards the preventing of my Countries falling into either of these extremes, I should think my self very happy in my generation. I am afraid, I confess, our neighbours the *French*, who have long owed this Nation a kindness, will not loose any opportunity to bring the first of them amongst us, when ever they can. And I am sorry to have some grounds to think, there is a party in our own bowels, and no inconsiderable one neither, that *do* not want parts, nor *will* not-diligence, to introduce the other. And I know nothing under the good Providence of God so like to disappoint the powerful and cunning designs of these contrary parties, as the supporting

ing their present Majesties on the Throne ; who not to flatter them, which I think the worst service the greatest enemies they have can do them ; have a great many qualities to make themselves beloved, and their people happy. Nothing that I know can more contribute towards the disapproving the practices, of all in the Nation, that are fond either of Arbitrary, or Commonwealth Principles, than a habit of moderation in our Princes ; that the people may see they affect not boundless Authority, but that it is in their Nature, and their Judgment, to govern according to the Laws. This temper at the same time supports, encourages, and gives new life to all that are dispos'd to be peaceable and quiet, and who have a mind to be growing rich, and thrive in the Nation : which are undoubtedly the most considerable and the greatest number. This is a temper I hope their Majesties have inherent in them, and I really think so, because I cannot see what other interest they have in the World. One quality I have heard sufficiently of them both, which I may mention without flattery, that I hope will hinder them from falling into any very dangerous errors ; and that is, a slowness that appears universally in their counsels, and as it were a sort of diffidence in determining any thing of weight ; which causes indeed many grievous delays in business, and on that account, is not without heavy complaints : but considering that they are both new in the Government, and strangers in the Country, if that temper lasts but till they grow well enough inform'd, to be able to judge by their own knowledge, rather than by other mens representations, I should find no great fault with such an infirmity.

To conclude, now I should hope that what has been said here, with very honest intentions, might contribute to persuade men, who are really conscientious, to think they ought to come in, to do what in them lies to support

port this Government; which was the occasion of my giving your Lordship this trouble, and to convince them,

That the misfortunes befallen King *James*, as they were unavoidable, so are they irrecoverable.

That no King can have a right so sacred by divine institution, that it must upon no account be set aside, where the People have so great a share in all occurrences of moment, that they do perpetually change and sometimes lessen that right in many particulars throughout the whole course of the Government.

That our Oaths never did nor can bind us to an allegiance beyond our Laws.

And that no People under Heaven can live long in subjection to a King, who is entirely and perpetually opposite to their true interest and happiness.

—— *Si quid novisti rectius istis
Candidus imperti si non his utere mecum.*

My Lord,

Your Lordships most humble Servant.